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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal consist of the following: 1) 
Whether the Respondent's statements during its television broadcast that 
the Appellant was involved in a possible cover-up of criminal activities 
during a County Attorney's Office criminal investigation constituted 
slander per se as alleging Appellant had committed a crime or that his 
conduct was incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, 
profession, or office and was therefore actionable; 2) whether the trial 
judge acted properly in making his determination that if a statement is 
capable of at least two different interpretations, then, as a matter of 
law, the Respondent's statements could not be slanderous per se, or whether 
it was an issue of fact more properly left to the jury, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
presiding, granted Summary Judgment in favor of Respondents. The trial 
court held that where allegedly defamatory words in a television broadcast 
are capable of two different interpretations, one interpretation applying 
to the Appellant's personal reputation and the other to his professional 
reputation, a public official could not sue for either libel or slander per 
se. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, Don Harman ("Appellant"), is Chief Investigator for 
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and has been so employed for the 
last fifteen years (Complaint, paragraphs 1-2). He has had the confidence 
of his employer and has been of good reputation in the community and among 
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his colleagues and peers in the law enforcement community (Complaint, 
paragraph 3). The Appel lant 's reputat ion as an honest and outstanding 
pol ice o f f i c e r / i n v e s t i g a t o r is essent ial to his a b i l i t y to perform his 
employment to the standards set by his employment (Complaint, paragraph 4) . 
On November 8, 1984, at approximately 10:00 p.m., during one of 
the Respondent, KTVX's news broadcasts, the Respondent, Phil Riesen, an 
employee of KTVX, stated "the news comes mid the allegations that a recent 
Salt Lake County Attorney's investigation on the same subject may en ta i l a 
cover-up11 (Complaint, paragraph 9) . Then the Respondent, John Harrington, 
an employee of KTVX, narrated a television broadcast displaying a p ic ture 
of the Appellant stat ing: 
"Don Harman is the chief inves t iga tor for the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's O f f i ce . As such he supervised the corrupt ion probe of the 
County Constable operat ion. As part of that , he investigated a car sale 
that took place at th is West Valley City car l o t . At least one Constable 
called that sale i l l e g a l . Don Harman participated in the sale, putting him 
in the position of investigating himself. Here is what happened: 
West Valley City Constable, Scott Stoweirs picked up an 
$8,000 car on a court order. Stowers was the focus of 
the County's probe. Salt Lake County Constable, Lynn 
Huffman says the sale was kept secret so ins iders had a 
chance to get the car cheap. Harman bid low. The 
vehicle ended up going for $3,200. This report is the 
f r u i t of the County Attorney's Constable corruption and 
investigat ion. Even though the probe uncovered wrong 
doing, i t f e l l short of criminal charges. In an inter-
view today, County Attorney Ted Cannon said he was 
personally inves t iga t ing Harman's investigation in the 
car sale. We asked Cannon i f Harman's actions may have 
dampened Harman's zeal to pursue the corruption probe 
further. Said Cannon ' I can ' t say that i s n ' t so . ' Now 
that the Attorney General's of f ice and the Salt Lake City 
Police Department are both invest igat ing the corrupt ion 
of the Constable system, and now that the County 
Attorney's investigation has been reopened, Law Enforce-
ment officials are saying privately they expect criminal 
charges to be filed and that those charges may even 
extend in the State Department of Social Services." 
(Complaint, paragraph 12). 
The communicated information about the Appellant's alleged 
cover-up and improper involvement in the Corruption probe was false, 
malicious, defamatory and made in reckless disregard of the facts (Com-
plaint, paragraph 15). On November 9, 1984, the Appellant contacted the 
Respondent, KTVX, by telephone and told the Respondent about the inaccur-
acy of the their November 8, 1984 broadcast concerning the Appellant; 
despite this conversation the Respondent again aired the above informa-
tion on its newscast of November 9, 1984 (Complaint, paragraph 22). 
Respondents1 broadcasts were heard and seen throughout Utah and the 
Intermountain West by thousands of viewers; as a result, the Appellant was 
exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridicule and injured his reputation 
in his profession and in his community (Complaint, paragraphs 14 and 16). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In point I of this Brief, the Appellant contends that, in light of 
recent Utah Supreme Courts decisions, the Respondents1 statements and 
allegations made about the Appellant constituted slander per se and are 
actionable; these statements are actionable in that they impute criminal 
conduct to the Appellant and that his conduct was incompatible with the 
exercise of lawful business, trade, profession, or office. 
In point II of this Brief, Appellant contends that if the 
Respondents1 statements about the Appellant were capable of at least two 
different meanings, one of which is defamatory the other innocent, then it 
would be proper to submit the issue to the jury to determine the manner in 
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which it was actually understood. This approach should be applied separ-
ately to each issue: that of imputation of criminal conduct to Appellant 
and to conduct incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
RESPONDENTS1 BROADCAST STATEMENTS CONCERNING 
APPELLANT CONSTITUTED SLANDER PER SE 
A. The Respondents1 statements that the Appellant was involved 
in a cover-up imputed criminal conduct to the Appellant and 
was therefore slander per se. 
In the case of Baum v. Gillman, 667 p.2d 41 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court faced a situation in which the allegedly defamatory statements about 
the Appellant had been made orally. There the court defined defamation 
per se as follows: 
"In order to constitute defamation per se, the defamatory 
words must charge criminal conduct, loathsome disease, 
conduct that is incompatible with the exercise of a 
lawful business, trade, profession, or office, or the 
unchastity of a woman." 
Jd. at 43. 
The facts of the instant case clearly support the allegation that 
defendants charged plaintiff with criminal conduct. The Respondents1 
broadcast stated: 
The news comes mid allegations that a recent Salt Lake 
County Attorney's investigation on the same subject may 
entail a cover-up. John Harrington has more on the 
developments in this report." 
After making that introductory allegation, the broadcast went on 
to state that the Appellant was the chief investigator of the County 
Attorney's Office; that he supervised the corruption probe; that he had a 
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motive to cover up the criminal investigation; that his zeal to pursue the 
corruption probe may have been dampened and that there may be criminal 
charges filed. 
These facts as alleged impute criminal conduct by the Appellant 
and clearly fall within prior Utah case law. The test of "whether defama-
tory words are actionable per se is to be determined by their injurious 
character. The words must be of such common notoriety that damage can be 
presumed from the words alone," Baum, 667 P.2d at 43, and the words are to 
be construed according to their usual popular and common acceptance. 
Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316, 
318 (1966). The purpose of such a requirement is to create a presumption 
that the Appellant has suffered pecuniary damage without the necessity of 
pleading and proving special damages; thus, the court can legally presume 
that the Appellant has been damaged. Nicholls v. Daily Reporter Co., 30 
Utah 74, 83 p. 573 (1905). The effect of this requirement is that where 
there is no slander per se, i.e., oral defamation falling within at least 
one of the four arbitrary categories, and no libel per se, i.e., written 
defamation that holds a person up to hatred, ridicule of contempt, damages 
are not presumed from the words alone, but must be specifically plead and 
proved. 
In the present case, the defendants alleged that the Appellant was 
involved in a cover-up of a Salt Lake County Attorney's Office criminal 
investigation. These words must be construed according to their "usual 
popular and common acceptance." Perhaps such words would not have denoted 
criminal conduct twenty, thirty or forty years ago, but that is not the 
test. The test is whether such words, construed according to their usual 
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popular and common acceptance, would denote criminal conduct in contem-
porary society. In the past decade the term cover-up has been prominent in 
the media. A former United States Attorney General was sentenced to prison 
for his part in the "cover-up" of "Watergate". Because of that and other 
media exposure, the term "cover-up" has taken on a meaning synonymous with 
criminal conduct. According to the above cited case law, the Respondents1 
statements do indeed allege criminal conduct by the Appellant and there-
fore are actionable. It is not necessary to allege further that the 
Appellant has suffered any special damage; the damage is presumed from the 
injurious character of the criminal allegation. 
This conclusion is supported by the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975). In that case the Respondent 
had made several written and oral statements that the Appellant was a 
drunk, a "clever crook" and that he was "stealing from his own children..." 
referring to his operation of a business, and his efforts to sell it. J[d at 
327-328. The court noted that general statements about another being a 
"crook" might not be actionable, but that it depended on the circumstances 
of each case. Ic^. The court continued: 
If words of that character are used in such a context or 
under such circumstances as they would reasonably be 
understood to come within the traditional requirement of 
libel or slander: that is, to hold a person up to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to injure him in his 
business or vocation, they are deemed actionable per se; 
and the law presumes that damages will be suffered 
therefrom." 
Id. (Even though not explicitly stated, this seems to be Utah's standard 
for what is commonly referred to as a crime of "moral turpitude" which is a 
standard to determine which crimes should be actionable per se. The 
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Appellant maintains that his fact situation falls within that standard. 
See 50 Am Jur 2d §28, p.540 (1970) (the words must charge a crime involving 
moral turpitude, or a criminal or disgraceful charge; the words must state 
or imply a discreditable or disgraceful thing, some wrongdoing, some 
circumstance which will expose the complaining party to contempt or scorn). 
Under the circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court expressed 
no doubt that the Defendant's statements (the statements referring to the 
Appellant being a clever crook, etc.) could reasonably be regarded as 
falling within the rule of law just stated. JkL 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the present case would also 
be "reasonably regarded as falling within the same rule of law" making the 
Respondents1 statements about the Appellant actionable per se. The 
Respondent stated that the Appellant was involved in a cover-up of a 
criminal investigation (when looking at the broadcast in its entirety). 
This allegation makes an even more persuasive case for the argument that 
the Respondents1 remarks were actionable per se. The allegation of a 
cover-up of a criminal investigation is more serious and potentially 
injurious than a statement that the Appellant is a "clever crook" and 
"stealing from his children" which has been held to be actionable per se by 
this court. Therefore, the trial court was in error in concluding that the 
Respondents1 statements about the Appellant were not, as a matter of law, 
actionable per se. 
The Respondent argued in the court below that All red v. Cook, 590 
P.2d 318 (Utah 1979), is dispositive of the instant case; but, Al1 red is 
clearly distinguishable. In All red, the Respondents stated that they had 
27 charges against the Appellant. The court held that the term "charges" 
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could have implied conduct attributable to his individual character and 
therefore was not actionable because slander per se must relate to the 
Appellant's professional reputation, not his personal reputation; since the 
charges were capable of two interpretations they were not actionable per 
j>e. ld_ at 321. 
Under the present facts, that argument is not applicable. The 
Appellant maintains that the Respondents1 statements concerning him imputed 
criminal conduct. An allegation of criminal conduct is one of the four 
arbitrary categories under slander per se in which an Appellant can 
recover without an allegation of special damages. Baum v. Gill am, 667 P.2d 
41 (Utah 1983). There is nothing in the case law that indicates that the 
four categories are overlapping, i.e., that in order to constitute slander 
per se under a charge of criminal conduct, it is necessary to prove conduct 
incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession, or 
office as well as criminal conduct. On the contrary, these categories 
represent four separate and distinct concepts that are disjunctive in their 
relationship to one another. Thus, in the present case, it is irrelevant 
whether the criminal conduct charged could be interpreted as applying to 
either the Appellant's personal or professional reputation. When the 
Appellant has successfully argued that Respondents1 broadcast alleged 
criminal conduct by the Appellant (in accordance with the Utah case law 
cited supra), then he has satisfied the requirements of slander per se and 
general damages are presumed. 
The logical conclusion is that since it is irrelevant whether the 
charges of criminal conduct apply to the Appellant's personal or profes-
sional reputation, it is not capable of two interpretations in the same 
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manner as Al 1 red and therefore Al 1 red is not dispositive of the present 
case. (See Point II for in depth discussion). 
B. Respondents1 statements that the Appellant was involved in the 
cover-up of a criminal investigation charges conduct incompa1> 
ible with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession, 
or office and is slanderous per se. 
The rules that apply to conduct incompatible with the exercise of 
a lawful business and the construction of allegedly defamatory language are 
the same as those cited in the previous section. See Baum v. Gill am, 667 
P.2d 41 (Utah 1983); Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 
2d 70, 415 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1966) (Words construed are to be construed 
according to their usual popular and common acceptance). 
The Appellant is chief investigator for the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office as well as a peace officer and he headed a Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office corruption probe. The facts of the present case 
show that the Respondents alleged that the Appellant was involved in the 
cover-up of a Salt Lake County Attorney's Office criminal investigation 
into corruption in county government. It seems obvious that if the 
Appellant were in fact involved in such a cover-up (the Appellant was not 
involved in any such cover-up), then his actions would be in direct 
conflict and indeed incompatible with the purpose of the investigation. Had 
the Appellant been so involved, his acts would have rendered him crimin-
ally liable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-8-201, Official Misconduct; 
§76-8-301, Interfering with Public Servants; §76-8-306, Obstructing 
Justice; §76-8-412, Abuse of Public Records by Custodian; §76-8-508, 
Witness Tampering; §76-8-510, Evidence Tampering. It would be difficult to 
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imagine a stronger case of an allegation of conduct incompatible with the 
exercise of a lawful profession. 
The Appellant's professional reputation is his reputation among 
his colleagues in the law enforcement community. The allegation that the 
Appellant covered up a criminal investigation is a serious blow to his 
credibility among his colleagues and his ability to function effectively as 
a law enforcement officer. The Second Restatements of Torts §559, comment 
b, treats this in the following way: 
"In the application of this idea [defamatory communica-
tion] it is enough that the communication would tend to 
prejudice the Appellant in the eyes of a substantial 
and respectable minority, but in such a case it must be 
shown that the communication did reach one or more 
persons of that minority group. This would normally be 
presumed, if the communication was a public one which 
was made in the newspaper or over radio or television. 
[Emphasis added] 
PROSSER AND KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §111 at 774 (5th ed. 
1984). Not only would those in the law enforcement community understand 
such a cover-up in its common and popular acceptance, but they would also 
realize that it would be a violation of the above-mentioned Code sections. 
Therefore, under the applicable principles of slander per se and specifi-
cally conduct incompatible with the exercise of a lawful profession, the 
Respondents1 allegations of a cover-up is actionable per se. 
Again, the Al 1 red case is distinguishable from the present case 
where the court held that since the 27 "charges" could have applied to 
either the Appellant's personal or professional reputation, that it was 
capable of two different interpretations and therefore, not actionable per 
se. This court was correct in its determination because there is no way 
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f o r the person hearing the allegations of "charges" to know whether they 
applied to a personal or professional reputa t ion . The present fac t 
s i t ua t i on is clearly distinguishable. The allegation of conduct incompat-
i b l e wi th the exercise of a lawful profession is the cover-up of the 
cr iminal inves t iga t ion of which the Respondent was the head. I t is not 
reasonable to think that the cover-up of a criminal investigation could in 
some way apply to the Appel lant 's personal reputation when the broadcast 
s p e c i f i c a l l y referred to his conduct in an inves t iga t ion and fu r ther 
re fer red to his professional t i t l e . This spec i f i c reference to the 
Appel lant 's professional conduct was missing in All red making i t inapplic-
able to the present case. 
POINT II 
IF RESPONDENTS1 CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT ARE CAPABLE OF 
TWO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS, IT IS A QUESTION FOR THE 
JURY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DEFAMATORY INTERPRETATION 
WAS IN FACT SO UNDERSTOOD. 
A. If the Respondents1 charges against the Appellant that he was 
involved in the cover-up of a criminal investigation are 
ambiguous or capable of two different meanings, then it is a 
question of fact to be decided by the jury. 
There seems to be no disagreement as to the proper role the court 
and jury play in determining what is capable of being defamatory and 
actionable per se. The general rule is that it is first for the court to 
determine whether the words are reasonably capable of a particular defam-
atory meaning; it is then a question for the jury to determine whether the 
words were so understood. Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Pitka, 376 P.2d 190, 
194 (Alaska 1962); Til ton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 459 P.2d 8,17-18 (Wash 
1969); Troutman v. Erlandson, 593 P.2d 793, 796 (Or.1979); Weeks v. M-P 
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Publications, Inc., 516 P.2d 193, 195 (Idaho 1973); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
TORTS, §614; PROSSER AND KEETON, at 781. The Washington Supreme Court 
stated that a determination as to whether defamation is reasonably capable 
of being actionable per se should be submitted to the jury in "all but 
extreme cases." Amsbury v. Cowles Publishing Co., 458 P.2d 882, 885-886 
(Wash 1969). 
The allegation that the Appellant was involved in the cover-up of 
a criminal investigation is slander per se. This is true whether the 
allegations fall within charges of criminal conduct or conduct incompatible 
with the exercise of a lawful profession. Therefore, since the Respon-
dents1 defamatory statements are reasonably capable of being slanderous per 
se, the issue should have been submitted to the jury to determine whether 
they were actually so understood. 
Furthermore, when language used is capable of two different 
interpretations, one of which would be defamatory and the other not, then 
it is for the jury to determine which interpretation would be given the 
words by those who read or heard them. Pitka, supra; PROSSER AND KEETON, 
supra at 781. 
In the present case, if it is determined that the Respondents1 
statements are capable of two different interpretations (although it is not 
clear what the innocent or non-defamatory interpretation would be), that 
alone should not preclude the issue from going to the jury to determine 
whether the Respondents1 statements concerning the Appellant , in order to 
constitute defamation per se, the words alone on their face must give rise 
to a presumption of damages. However, it does not follow that the interpre-
tation of such words must be made by the court in order to be actionable 
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per se. Conversely, all the case authority requiring that a slander per 
se determination can and ought to be made by the jury in the most situa-
tions. See Pitka, Cowles Publishing Co., Weeks v. M-F Publications, Inc., 
Troutman, Supra. When a factual issue of defamation per se is to be decided 
by the jury, the jurors should make their determination from the words 
alone, as they appear on their face, as would a court in its initial 
determination. No extrinsic facts are necessary to decide the per se issue 
as would be the case in libel per quod. See All red v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318 
(Utah 1979). 
This conclusion is entirely consistent with Al 1 red. In Al 1 red, 
the Appellant's theory was obviously one of slander per se, more specific-
ally arguing that the Respondents1 statements that they had 27 "charges" 
against him imputed conduct incompatible with the exercise of a lawful 
business, trade, profession, or office. All red at 320. However, in that 
case, the Appellant did not claim that his reputation had been damaged 
under the separate slander per se category of a charge of criminal conduct. 
Therefore, in order for the Appellant to recover in that case, he had to 
show that the words "charges" applied only to his professional reputation--
not his personal reputation. The reason for this was that the Appellant 
was only alleging damage to his professional reputation under that specific 
category of slander per se. 
The Supreme Court held that the words "27 charges against you" 
were too general to infer criminal conduct by the Appellant and rejected 
the Appellant's argument that it would be conduct incompatible with his 
profession and thus actionable per se. Since the allegedly defamatory 
words in Al1 red were too general, they could apply to both the Appellant's 
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personal and professional reputation and they would thus be capable of two 
different interpretations: one applying to the Appellant's professional 
reputation (which could be potentially actionable per se), the other 
applying to his personal reputation (which is not actionable per se under 
this specific category). If the Appellant in Al 1 red had alleged that his 
personal reputation had been damaged under the separate slander per se 
category of a charge of criminal conduct, then there would not have been 
the problem with the charge applying to the Appellant's personal reputa-
tion; because a charge of criminal conduct under the slander per se 
category can apply to both personal and professional reputation. 
Under the present facts, the Appellant is alleging that the 
Respondents charged him with both criminal conduct and conduct incompatible 
with the exercise of a lawful profession. Since criminal conduct is 
actionable per se if it relates to either the Respondents1 personal ^r 
professional reputation, the problem of two different interpretations in 
Al1 red poses no obstacle to the Respondents1 case. 
The holding in Al1 red is a narrow one. It stands for the proposi-
tion that conduct incompatible with a lawful business, trade, profession, 
or office must refer to the Respondents1 professional reputation in order 
to be actionable per se and to give rise to a presumption of damages. If 
such conduct could apply to a personal reputation, then it would be capable 
of two different interpretations vis a vis the slander per se standard of 
conduct and could not be actionable at all. That concept is substantially 
different than the concept Appellant is presenting here. 
In the present case, if the language of the entire newscast 
alleging a cover-up of a criminal investigation is such that it is capable 
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of two different interpretations, the persuasive case authority requires 
the issue be submitted to the jury. It does not dictate, (contrary to 
those who misconstrue All red), that such an issue be decided as a matter of 
law by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondents1 statements concerning the Appellant are defama-
tory and actionable per se. They allege that the Appellant had engaged in 
criminal conduct and conduct incompatible with the exercise of a lawful 
business, trade, profession, or office and is therefore sufficient to be 
actionable per se without any proof of special damages. This determination 
can be made from the words alone as recited in the Respondents1 broadcasts 
without any recourse to extrinsic facts to render it defamatory. 
The Respondents1 statements are clearly capable of a defamatory 
and slanderous meaning as per se. However, the issue created here is a 
factual one to be determined by a jury. It is for the jury to determine 
whether the words, once determined capable of a defamatory meaning, were in 
fact so understood. The issue of whether the Respondents' broadcast was 
capable of a defamatory meaning has been clearly established and it was 
error by the trial court not to have allowed the issue to be submitted to 
the jury for a determination. 
The Respondents1 statements cannot reasonably be seen as capable 
of two different interpretations, one defamatory and the other innocent. In 
any event, the general rule is that in such cases the issue should be 
submitted to the jury to determine which interpretation was in fact 
understood. The principle applied in Al1 red is separate from this general 
rule; it has narrow application where conduct incompatible with a lawful 
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business or profession can be interpreted as applying to personal reputa-
tion rendering the language non-actionable. The present case does not fall 
within that narrow rule and should therefore be allowed to be tried at the 
trial court for a resolution of the factual issues. 
The Appellant's standing in his profession has been substantially 
damaged as a result of the Respondents1 untrue and unfair news broadcast. 
To extend this courts ruling in Al1 red to the instant case where facts 
plead are substantially different would have the effect of doing away with 
the cause of action of slander per se in the State of Utah. Appellant 
submits this court did not intend such a result. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of October, 1985. 
BIELE, HASLAM^ HATCH 
David 0. Black, ^ ^ ~ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
David 0. Black, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is employed in the office of Biele, Haslam & Hatch, 
attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, Don Harman. 
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of Appellant's 
Brief upon the parties to the within described action addressed to: 
Donald J* Purser, 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first class, 
postage prepaid, on the **> day of October, 1985. 
David 0. Black 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7 ^ day of October, 1985, 
My Commission Expires: 
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DAVID 0. BLACK #0346, of 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-1666 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




UNITED TELEVISION, INC. 
a Delaware corporation dba 
KTVX TV; PHIL RIESEN, 
individually and as an employee 
of KTVX TV; and JOHN HARRINGTON, 
individually and as an employee 





, . > ,»-"•r-"'Q 
The Plaintiff, Don Harman hereby complains of the Defendant and 
for cause of action alleges as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. The Plaintiff is an investigator and employed by the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office and has been for the past 15 years. 
2. The Plaintiff currently holds the position of Chief 
Investigator for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and is a peace 
officer. 
*?. 
3. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff has had the confidence 
of his employer and was of good reputation in the community and among his 
colleagues and peers in the law enforcement community until publication by 
Defendants of the defamatory remarks set forth below* 
4. Plaintiff's reputation as an honest and outstanding police 
officer-investigator is essential to his ability to perform his employment 
to the standards set by his employment. 
5. The Defendant, Phil Riesen is a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah and at all times relevant hereto was employed as a newscaster 
by the Defendant United Television, Inc. 
6. The Defendant, John Harrington is a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah and at all times relevant and hereto was employed as 
a newscaster by the Defendant, United Television, Inc. 
7. The Defendant, United Television, Inc. owns and operates a 
television broadcasting station having the call letters KTVX. 
8. The Defendant, United Television, Inc. the Delaware 
corporation doing business as KTVX TV (hereinafter referred to as "KTVX") 
broadcasting its programs at approximately 5:30 o'clock and 10:00 p.m. 
weekdays and said programs are viewed and heard by a large audience 
throughout the state of Utah and the intermountain west. 
9. During the Defendant, KTVX's news broadcast on or about 
November 8, 1984, at 10:00 p.m. the Defendant Phil Riesen, an employee of 
KTVX stated "the news comes amid the allegations that a recent Salt Lake 
County Attorney's investigation on the same subject may entail a cover up." 
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10. The Defendant's broadcast was heard throughout Utah and the 
intermountain west by many thousands of viewers. 
11. The Defendants broadcast about the Plaintiff placed Plaintiff 
in a false light and portrayed Plaintiff as being involved in a cover up. 
It attributed dishonest actions to the Plaintiff all of which is defama-
tory and made in wanton and reckless disregard the facts and the Plain-
tiff's reputation in the community. 
12. On Defendant KTVX's news shows on or about November 8, 1984 
at about 10:00 p.m. and or about November 9, 1984 the Defendant, John 
Harrington, an employee of KTVX narrated a television broadcast displaying 
a picture of the Plaintiff stating 
"Don Harman is the chief investigator for the 
Salt Lake County Attorneyfs Office. As such he 
supervised the corruption probe of the County 
Constable operation. As part of that he 
investigated a car sale that took place at this 
West Valley City car lot. At least one Constable 
called that sale illegal. Don Harman partici-
pated in the sale, putting him in the position of 
investigating himself. Here is what happened: 
West Valley City Constable, Scott Stowers picked 
up an $8,000 car on a court order. Stowers was 
the focus of the County's Probe. Salt Lake County 
Constable, Lynn Huffman says the sale was kept 
secret so insiders had a chance to get the car 
cheap. Harman bid low. The vehicle ended up 
going for $3,200. This report is the fruit of 
the County Attorney's Constable corruption and 
investigation. Even though the probe uncovered 
wrong doing, it fell short of criminal charges. *" 
In an interview today, County Attorney Ted Cannon 
said he was personally investigating Harman's 
investigation in the car sale. We asked Cannon 
if Harman's actions may have dampened Harman's 
zeal to pursue the corruption probe further. Said 
Cannon "I can't say that isn't so". Now that the 
Attorney's General Office and the Salt Lake City 
Police Department are both investigating the 
corruption of the Constable system, and now that 
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the County Attorney's investigation has been 
reopened, Law Enforcement officials are saying 
privately they expect criminal charges to be 
filed and that those charges may even extend in 
the State Department of Social Services. 
14. Defendants broadcast was heard throughout Utah and the 
intermountain West and by many thousands of viewers. 
15. Defendants broadcasts about Plaintiff were false, malicious, 
defamatory and made in reckless disregard the facts. 
16. Defendants broadcast exposed Plaintiff to public hatred, 
contempt ridicule and injured him in his profession and in his community. 
17. Defendants broadcast containing the false libelous and 
defamatory information complained of herein has caused the Plaintiff to 
suffer great mental anguish, pain, suffering and humiliation to which 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages against the Defendant and each of 
them in the sum of $25,000. 
18. Defendants broadcast containing false libelous and defamatory 
information complained of herein, has damaged his reputation in the amount 
of $50,000. 
19. Defendants broadcast was malicious or made in wanton and 
reckless disregard of the facts for which Plaintiff should be awarded 
punitive damages in the sum of $100,000. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
20. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 19 of his first 
cause of action and realleges the same herein. 
21. The context of the broadcast by the Defendants about the 
Plaintiff implied that Plaintiff was, and his acts violated the law. 
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Viewers understood the broadcast to mean that Plaintiff was dishonest and 
was engaged in illegal activities. 
22. On November 9, 1984 at about 4:00 p.m. Plaintiff contacted 
Defendant KTVX by telephone and told the Defendant about the inaccuracy of 
the above referenced broadcast during November 8, 1984 and as a result of 
those conversations, Defendant KTVX again aired the broadcast after 
receiving said information on its newscast on November 9, 1984. 
23. Plaintiff has demanded a retraction and apology pursuant to 
45-2-1.5 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) and Defendant has failed to 
comply. 
24. On or about November 20, 1984, the Plaintiff contacted the 
Defendant KTVX and requested that the Defendant produce the video tape of 
the November 9, 1984 5:30 p.m. newscast which the Defendant refused to do 
in violation of Section 45-1-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
25. Defendants broadcast containing the false libelous and 
defamatory information complained of herein has caused the Plaintiff to 
suffer great mental anguish, pain, suffering and humiliation to which 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages against the Defendant and each of 
them in the sum of $25,000. 
26. Defendants broadcast containing false libelous and defamatory 
information complained of herein has damaged his reputation in the amount 
of $50,000. 
27. Defendants broadcast was malicious or made in wanton and 
reckless disregard of the facts for which Plaintiff should be awarded 
punitive damages in the sum of $100,000. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendant, 
jointly and severely as follows: 
1. $25,000 for mental and physical suffering for the Defendants 
broadcast on November 8, 1984. 
2. $50,000 for damage to his reputation for the Defendants 
broadcast on November 8, 1984. 
3. $100,000 for punitive damages for the Defendants broadcast on 
November 8, 1984. 
4. $25,000 for mental and physical suffering for the Defendants 
broadcast on November 9, 1984. 
5. $50,000 for damaged to his reputation for the Defendants 
broadcast on November 9, 1984. 
6. $100,000 for punitive damages for the Defendants broadcast on 
November 9, 1984. 
7. For such other and further relief as this court deems proper 
in the premises. 
DATED this ^^ day of December, 1984. 
Plaintiff's Address: 
3836 Rosemary Hunter 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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<^; :D IN CLERK'SOFflC£ 
Sal? Lake County ' ilzh 
JUL 2 3 1985 
DONALD J. PURSER, #2663 
Attorney for defendants To Hsf*'** c,tt?-*y c*t Court 
520 Boston Bldg. " ^ ^^^^-/^r' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 ->-yf < 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON HARMAN, ) ORDER 
Plaintiff, ) Civil No. C84-7528 
-vs- ) Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
UNITED TELEVISION, INC, , et al.J 
Defendants. ) 
On July 15, 1985, defendants (KTVX-TV) moved this Court for 
an Order granting them Summary Judgment in their favor. 
KTVX-TV was represented by Donald J. Purser, Esq. Plaintiff 
was represented by David Black, Esq. 
The Court having reviewed the Memoranda filed by counsel and 
having heard oral arguments thereon, finds as follows. 
The broadcasts which form the bases for plaintiff's causes 
of action do not give rise to a cognizable claim for defamation 
per se« Plaintiff failed to plead special damages and therefore, 
he cannot even maintain an action for defamation per quod. 
Accordingly, the allegations filed by plaintiff against the 
defendants are ORDERED to be DISMISSED, with prejudice and on the 
merits inasmuch as plaintiff has no cause of action, costs to the 
defendant. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
z3 fas'. BY THB COURT: 
JSENNKI TH RIGTRUP 
M l I CO I 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
Deoutv CieflT 
76-8-109 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-8-109. Failure of member of legislature to disclose interest in mea*. 
lire or bilL—Every member of the legislature who has a personal or private 
interest in any measure or bill proposed or pending before the legislature of 
which he is a member and do6s not disclose the fact to the house of which 
he is a member and votes thereon is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: O. 1953, 76-8-109, enacted by 
I* 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-109. 
Part 2 
Abase of Office 
76-8-201. Official misconduct—Unauthorized acts or failure of duty.— 
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with an intent to 
benefit himself or another or to harm another, he knowingly commits an 
unauthorized act which purports to be an act of his office, or knowingly 
refrains from performing a duty imposed on him by law or clearly inherent 
in the nature of his office. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-201, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-201. Officers<§=>121. 
Cross-References. 6 7 C.J.S. Officers § 133. 
Penalty for receiving illegal fees, 21-7- 6 3 A m - J u r - 2 d 837> Public Officers and 
13 to 21-7-15. Employees § 346. 
76-8-202. Official misconduct—Unlawful acts based on "inside" infor-
mation.—A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, knowing 
that official action is contemplated or in reliance on information which he 
has acquired by virtue of his office or from another public servant, which 
information has not been made public, he: 
(1) Acquires or divests himself of a pecuniary interest in any prop-
erty, transaction, or enterprise which may be affected by such action or in-
formation ; or 
(2) Speculates or wagers on the basis of such action or information; or 
(3) Knowingly aids another to do any of the foregoing. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-202, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, en. 196, § 76-8-202. Officers<£=*121. 
67 C.J.S. Officers § 133. 
63 Am. Jur. 2d 837, Public Officers and 
Employees § 346. 
76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct.—(1) A person is guilty of unofficial 
misconduct if he exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions of a 
public office when: 
(a) He has not taken and filed the required oath of office; or 
(b) He has failed to execute and file the required bond; or 
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to office; or 
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(d) He exercises any of the functions of his office after his term has 
expired and the successor has been elected or appointed and has qualified, 
or after his office has been legally removed. 
(e) He knowingly withholds or retains from his successor in office or 
other person entitled to the official seal or any records, papers, documents, 
or other writings appertaining or belonging to his office or mutilates or 
destroys or takes away the same. 
(2) Unofficial misconduct is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-203, enacted by Constitutionality of statute requiring, or 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-203. limiting, selection or appointment of pub-
lic officers or agents from members of a 
Collateral References. political party or parties, 170 A. L. R. 198. 
Oflicers<S=>121. Time as of which eligibility or ineligi-
67 C.J.S. Officers § 133. bility to office is to be determined, 143 
63 Am. Jur. 2d 837, Public Officers and A. L. R. 1026. 
Employees § 046. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Mandamus of de facto officers. ute to compel them to perform duties they 
Mandamus could issue against de facto hf ld already voluntarily assumed to do. 
drainage district officers who had not Colorado Development Co. v. Creer, 96 U. 
made oath and filed bond required by stat- l> 8 0 p - 2 d 9 1 4 « 
Parts 
Obstructing Governmental Operations 
76-8-301. Interference with public servant.—A person is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor if he uses force, violence, intimidation, or engages in 
any other unlawful act with a purpose to interfere with a public servant 
performing or purporting to perform an official function. 
History: C. 1963, 76-8-301, enacted by 58 Am. Jur. 2d 862, Obstructing Justice 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-301. § 10. 
Collateral References. Criminal liability for obstructing proc-
Obstructing Justice<S=>2. ess as affected by invalidity or irregular-
67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 1. lty of the process, 10 A. L. B. 3d 1146. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Elements of offense. ficer in discharge of duty. State in Inter-
To make out offense it must have ap- e s t ° f Hurley, 28 IT. (2d) 248, 501 P. 2d 
peared that (a) duly constituted public 111» 
officer, (b) engaged in performance of of- Employer who refused to bring employ-
final duty, (c) had been obstructed or re- ee out of factory so that deputy sheriff 
•»»sted by defendant. State v. Sandman, 4 could serve her with small claims court 
l
' (2d) 69, 286 P. 2d 1060. order was not obstructing officer in per-
Umversity security officer who arrested forming his duty where employer had no 
"indent m area where sole interests of uni- objections to service during various work 
^ rsity were location of fraternity and breaks, including coffee, but not during 
r(,li£ious institute for students was not working hours, since particular manufac-
'liHchargmg, or attempting to discharge, turing process became dangerous if work 
"ny duty of his office, and subsequent in- were impeded. State v. Ludlow, 28 XJ. (2d) 
^rference with arrest by fellow student 434, 503 P. 2d 1210. 
*aa not resistance or obstruction of of-
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Game wardens. unreasonable and was consistent with his 
Game wardens, were by law peace of- duty. s t a t e v- Sandman, 4 U. (2d) 69, 
ficers who had same power and followed ^86 P. 2d 1060. 
same procedure in making arrests as other 
peace officers. State v. Sandman, 4 U. (2d) Indictment or information. 
69, 286 P. 2d 1060. Under indictment of resisting officer in 
Defendant's refusal to permit game discharge of his duty, specific duty at-
warden to inspect his bait and subsequent tempted to have been discharged and to 
disposal of bait amounted to obstruction which resistance was offered should have 
or resistance of officer in performance of been alleged in information, and proof of-
his duty; since game warden had identified fered must have supported allegations of 
himself after his suspicions had been information. State v. Beckendorf, 79 U. 
aroused, his request to see bait was not 360, 10 P. 2d 1073. 
76-8-302. Picketing or parading in or near court.—A person is guilty of 
a class B misdemeanor if he pickets or parades in or near a building which 
houses a court of this state with intent to obstruct access to that court or 
to affect the outcome of a case pending before that court. 
History: O. 1953, 76-8-302, enacted by 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 7. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-302. 58 Am. Jur. 2d 856, Obstructing Justice 
S3. CoUateral References. ° 
Obstructing Justice*©^. Picketing of court or judge as contempt, 
58 A. L. E. 3d 1297. 
76-8-303. Prevention of legislature or public servants from meeting or 
organizing.—A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he in-
tentionally and by force or fraud : 
(1) Prevents the legislature, or either of the houses composing it, or 
any of the members thereof, from meeting or organizing; or 
(2) Prevents any other public servant from meeting or organizing to 
perform a lawful governmental function. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-303, enacted by 27 C.J.S. Disturbance of Public Meet-
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-303. ings § 1. 
_ „
 A „ _ m 24 Am. Jur. 2d 141, Disturbing Meetings 
CoUateral Eeferences. § 1# ° 
Disturbance of Public Assemblage*©^. 
76-8-304. Disturbing legislature or official meeting.—(1) A person is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(a) He intentionally disturbs the legislature, or either of the houses 
composing it, while in session; or 
(b) He intentionally commits any disorderly conduct in the immediate 
view and presence of either house of the legislature, tending to interrupt 
its proceedings or impair the respect of its authority; or 
(c) Intentionally disturbs an official meeting or commits any disorderly 
conduct in immediate view and presence of participants in an official meet-
ing tending to interrupt its proceedings. 
(2) "Official meeting," as used in this section, means any lawful meet-
ing of public servants for the purposes of carrying on governmental func-
tions. 
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History: C. 1953, 76-8-304, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-304. 
Collateral References. 
Disturbance of Public Assemblage<@=»l. 
27 C.J.S. Disturbance of Public Meet-
ings § 1. 
24 Am. Jur. 2d 141, Disturbing Meetings 
§1. 
Law Reviews. 
The King's Peace: Riot Law in Its His-
torical Perspective, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 240. 
76-8-305. Unconstitutional. 
Constitutionality. 
Section 76-8-305 (L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-
305) which made it unlawful to intention-
ally interfere with recognized law enforce-
ment official seeking to detain interferor 
or another, regardless of whether there 
was legal basis for arrest, was unconstitu-
tionally vague. State v. Bradshaw, 541 P. 
2d 800. 
76-8-306. Obstructing justice.—(1) A person is guilty of an offense 
if, with intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of 
a crime, he: 
(a) Knowing an offense has been committed, conceals it from a magis-
trate ; or 
(b) Harbors or conceals the offender; or 
(c) Provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other 
means for avoiding discovery or apprehension; or 
(d) Warns such offender of impending discovery or apprehension; or 
(e) Conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence that might aid 
in the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of such person; or 
(f) Obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone from per-
forming an act which might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecu-
tion or conviction of such person. 
(2) An offense under this section is a class B misdemeanor unless the 
actor knows that the offender committed a capital offense or a felony of 
the first degree, in which case it is a felony of the second degree. 
History: O. 1953, 76-8-306, enacted by 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-306. 
Cross-References. 
Proceedings of grand jury to be kept 
secret, 77-19-10. 
Conviction of one assisted unnecessary. 
Conviction of the offender for a capital 
<»flVnse or first degree felony is not a 
prerequisite to convicting defendant of a 
x'-ond degree felony for a violation of 
"i«s section. State v. Bingham, 575 P. 2d 
11*7. 
Knowledge of capital offense or first de-
cree felony. 
Evidence that defendant heard gun-
*
!
'ots and then aided his friend who did 
t!l
*' shooting in escaping from the scene 
was insufficient to establish that defend-
ant knew that a homicide had been com-
mitted where there was no direct proof 
that defendant was at the scene of the 
shooting or that he was told by his friend 
what had happened. State v. Bingham, 
575 P. 2d 197. 
Collateral References. 
Obstructing Justice<£=*2. 
67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 1. 
58 Am. Jur. 2d 854, Obstructing Justice 
§ i . 
Dispute over custody as affecting 
charge of obstructing or resisting ar-
rest, 3 A. L. E. 1290. 
What constitutes offense of obstructing 
or resisting officer, 48 A„ L. E. 746. 
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DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Elements of offense. 
University security officer who arrested 
student in area where sole interests of 
university were location of fraternity and 
religious institute for students was not 
discharging, or attempting to discharge, 
any duty of his office, and subsequent in-
terference with arrest by fellow student 
was not resistance or obstruction of of-
ficer in discharge of duty. State in inter-
est of Hurley, 28 U. (2d) 248, 501 P. 2d 
111. 
Employer who refused to bring em-
ployee out of factory so that deputy sher-
iff could serve her with small claims court 
order was not obstructing officer in per-
forming his duty where employer had no 
objections to service during various work 
breaks, including coffee, but not during 
working hours, since particular manufac-
turing process became dangerous if work 
were impeded. State v. Ludlow, 28 U. (2d) 
434, 503 P. 2d 1210. 
Game wardens. 
Game wardens were by law peace of-
1 
76-8-307. Failure to aid peace officer.—A person is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor if, upon command by a peace officer identifiable or identified 
by him as such, he unreasonably fails or refuses to aid the peace officer in 
effecting an arrest or in preventing the commission of any offense by 
another person. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-307, enacted by Cross-Eeferences. 
L. 1973, eh. 196, § 76-8-307. Officer may command assistance, 77-5-1. 
fleers who bad same power and followed 
same procedure in making arrests as other 
peace officers. State v. Sandman, 4 XJ. (2d) 
69, 286 P. 2d 1060. 
Defendant's refusal to permit game 
warden to inspect his bait and subsequent 
disposal of bait amounted to obstruction 
or resistance of officer in performance of 
his duty; since game warden had identi-
fied himself after his suspicions had been 
aroused, his request to see bait was not 
unreasonable and was consistent with his 
duty. State v. Sandman, 4 U. (2d) 69, 286 
P. 2d 1060. 
Scope and operation. 
Former statute which prohibited dis-
closure of grand jury proceedings did not 
forbid disclosure when required by court, 
as where grand juror was called to testify 
before petit jury regarding confession 
made by defendant when testifying vol-
untarily before grand jury. United States 
v. Kirkwood, 5 U. 123, 126, 13 P. 234. 
76-8-308. Acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent criminal prosecu-
tion—Defense.—(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
(a) Solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit as consideration 
for his refraining from initiating or aiding in a criminal prosecution; or 
(b) Confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon another as 
consideration for the person refraining from initiating or aiding in a 
criminal prosecution; 
(2) It is an affirmative defense that the value of the benefit did not 
exceed an amount which the actor believed to be due as restitution or 
indemnification for the loss caused or to be caused by the offense. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-308, enacted by CoUateral References. 
Extortion<S=*l. 
35 C.J.S. Extortion § 1. 
31 Am. Jur. 2d 900, Extortion, Black-
mail, and Threats § 1. 
Communicating with grand jury or 
member thereof as a criminal offense, 112 
A. L. R. 319. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-308. 
Cross-References. 
Bribery involving tampering with or re-
taliation against a witness or informant, 
76-8-508. 
Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal 
proceeding, 76-8-509. 
176 
OFFENSES AGAINST GOVERNMENT 76-8-412 
History: 0. 1953, 76-8-409, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-409. Taxation<£=>310. 
85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1025. 
72 Am. Jur. 2d 59, State and Local 
Taxation § 727. 
76-8-410. Doing business without license.—Every person who com-
mences or carries on any business, trade, profession, or calling, for the trans-
action or carrying on of which a license is required by any law, or by 
any county, city, or town ordinance, without taking out the license required 
by law or ordinance is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: 0. 1953, 76-8-410, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-410. Licenses<§=*40. 
53 C.J.S. Licenses § 66. 
51 Am. Jur. 2d 75, Licenses and Per-
mits § 72. 
76-8-411. Trafficking in warrants.—No state, county, city, town, or dis-
trict officer shall, either directly or indirectly, contract for or purchase 
any warrant or order issued by the state, county, city, town, or district of 
which he is an officer, at any discount whatever upon the sum due on the 
warrant or order, and, if any state, county, city, town, or district officer 
shall so contract for or purchase any such order or warrant on a discount, 
he is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: O. 1953, 76-8-411, enacted by CoUateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-411. States<§=>136. 
81 C.J.S. States § 168. 
63 Am. Jur. 2d 837, Public Officers and 
Employees § 346. 
76-8-412. Stealing, destroying or mutilating public records by cus-
todian.—Every officer having the custody of any record, map, or book, or 
of any paper or proceedings of any court, filed or deposited in any public 
office, or placed in his hands for any purpose, who is guilty of stealing, will-
fully destroying, mutilating, defacing, altering, falsifying, removing, or 
accreting the whole or any part thereof, or who permits any other person 
*o to do, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
History: O. 1953, 76-8-412, enacted by CoUateral References. 
I* 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-412. Officers<S=>121. 
Oross-References. 67 C.J.S. Officers § 133. 
Forgery, 76-6-501. 6 3 A m - J u r - 2<i 837> Public Officers and 
, Fraudulent handling of recordable writ- E m P l o v e e s § 3 4 6-
'"C", 76-6-503. 
Tampering with records, 76-6-504. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
nmptions. access to them had not falsified them; 
l n r o
 it was a felony to falsify court this presumption extended to juvenile 
JH,or<'«, it was presumed records of court court records. In re State in Interest of 
•
f
* correct and that those who had * Graham, 110 U. 159, 170 P. 2d 172. 
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76-8-502 (2), falsity of a statement may not be established solely through 
contradiction by the testimony of a single witness. 
(2) No prosecution shall be brought under this part when the substance 
of the defendant's false statement is his denial of guilt in a previous crim-
inal trial. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-505, enacted by 
L. 1973, eh. 196, §76-8-505. 
76-8-506. False reports of offenses to law enforcement officer.—A per-
son is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
(1) Knowingly gives or causes to be given false information to any 
law enforcement officer with a purpose of inducing the officer to believe that 
another has committed an offense; or 
(2) Knowingly gives or causes to be given information to any law 
enforcement officer concerning the commission of an offense, knowing 
that the offense did not occur or knowing that he has no information 
relating to the offense or danger. 
History: O. 1953, 76-8-506, enacted by 
L. 1973, clL 196, §76-8-506. 
76-8-507. False name or address to law enforcement officer.—A person 
commits a class C misdemeanor if, with intent of misleading a law enforce-
ment officer as to his identity, he knowingly gives a false name or address 
to a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties. 
History: O. 1953, 76-8-507, enacted by 
L. 1973, ClL 196, §76-8-507. 
76-8-508. Tampering with witness—Retaliation against witness or in-
formant—Bribery.—A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person 
to: 
(a) Testify or inform falsely; or 
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing; or 
(c) Elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which 
he has been summoned; or 
(2) He commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by 
another in his capacity as a witness or informant; or 
(3) He solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in considera-
tion of his doing any of the things specified in paragraph (1). 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-508, enacted by 11 C.J.S. Bribery § 2. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-508. 12 Am. Jur. 2d 749, Bribery § 3. 
Cross-References. 
Accepting bribe, or bribery, to prevent Admissibility, in prosecution for bribery 
criminal prosecution, 76-8-308. o r accepting bribes, of evidence tending 
fiftiU.a„ , _ „ to show the commission of other bribery 
collateral References.





76-8-509 CRIMINAL CODE 
s 
Falsity of contemplated testimony as gift by, prospective witness, 110 A. L. R. 
condition of offense of bribery of, at- 582. 
tempt to bribe, or acceptance of bribe or 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Evidence. fendant as to subornation charged. State 
In prosecution for subornation of per- v- Gleason, 86 U. 26, 40 P. 2d 222. 
jury, record of plea of guilty of perjury Where defendant and witness were ac-
by person alleged to have been procured complices in perjury, corroboration of 
to commit perjury was inadmissible. witness's testimony was unnecessary to 
State v. Justesen, 35 U. 105, 99 P. 456. convict defendant of subornation. State 
In prosecution of attorney fo^ suborna- v- McGee, 26 U. (2d) 373, 489 P. 2d 1188. 
tion of jury, evidence was sufficient to 
sustain conviction although only evidence Status of crime. 
was testimony of person alleged to have Crime of subornation of perjury was 
been suborned, since perjury and suborna- separate and distinct offense from that 
tion of perjury were distinct offenses and of perjury. State v. Justesen, 35 U. 105, 
such witness was not accomplice of de- 99 P. 456. 
76-8-509. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding.—(1) A 
person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if by the use of force or 
by any threat which would constitute a means of committing the crime of 
theft by extortion under this code, if the threat were employed to obtain 
property, or by promise of any reward or pecuniary benefits, he attempts 
to induce an alleged victim of a crime to secure the dismissal of or to pre-
vent the filing of a criminal complaint, indictment, or information. 
(2) ''Victim," as used in this section, includes a child or other person 
under the care or custody of a parent or guardian. 
History: O. 1953, 76-8-509, enacted by 86 C.J.S. Threats and Unlawful Com-
L. 1973> ch. 196, § 76-8-609. munications § 4. 
Cross-References. 
Accepting bribe, or bribery, to prevent 
31 Am. Jur. 2d 911, Extortion, Black-
mail, and Threats § 14. 
criminal prosecution, 76-8-308. 
oUateral References. 
Threats<§=3l(l). 49 A. L. R. 3d 820 
Criminal liability of corporation for ex-
C ter l efere ces. tortion, false pretenses, or similar offenses, 
76-8-510. Tampering with evidence.—A person commits a felony of the 
second degree if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose 
to impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he knows to be false with 
a purpose to deceive a public servant who is or may be engaged in a 
proceeding or investigation. 
History: O. 1953, 76-8-510, enacted by CoUateral References. 
L. 1973, en, 196, §76-8-510. Obstructing Justice<^5. 
67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 10. 
29 Am. Jur. 2d 338, Evidence § 292. 
76-8-511. Falsification or alteration of government record.—A person 
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
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